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The Voting Right Act guaranteed the right to vote for minorities, including the prohibition
of any electoral discriminatory practices on the basis of race. This triggered a series of court
decisions outlawing discriminatory electoral rules between 1970 and 1990. I study the effects of
several court orders that guarantee minority representation on city public budgets, and find that
both local public good expenditures (5-7.5%) and city tax collection (5-10%) increased, after the
changes towards non-discriminatory electoral rules. I also explore the distributional consequences
of non-discriminatory elections and find that the fraction of black public workers and citizens
increased after changes in the election system, while those of whites decreased. The growth rates
of black house values and rents also increase more. The findings are inconsistent with a negative
effect of ethnic heterogeneity in the city council on public goods, and with common-pool theories.
I show evidence that the most plausible channel that explains the results is the new legislative
bargaining power that black communities gained.
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“Whites put fire hydrants mainly in their neighborhoods and few in the black
areas... and small water lines to black hydrants made them useless.” -Black town
councilman, Gretna, Florida. (Button, 1989, p. 114).
1 Introduction
When blacks and whites prefer different candidates at the polls, electoral districts
can be drawn such that whites obtain all representatives, ensuring that minori-
ties can never elect a candidate of their choice. In 1973, the US Supreme Court
considered that such election methods could be proven to be unlawful if mem-
bers of a group “had less opportunity to participate in the political processes and
to elect legislators of their choice.”1 This ruling triggered the development of a
national jurisprudence that, on a gradual basis, further clarified and reduced the
burden of proof necessary to outlaw discriminatory electoral methods (Davidson
and Grofman, 1994a; Gerken, 2001).2 In this paper I exploit the court-orders
that externally enforced changes towards non-discriminatory election rules to look
for the effects on local public goods, taxation, housing values and rents, public
workers, and sorting, of the prohibition of discriminatory elections.
The sample is a panel of cities that were externally required to change their
electoral rule and cities that were not. I focus on a specific type of discriminatory
electoral rule, at-large elections, and the solution engineered by the courts to it:
single-districts. In an at-large system, city elections are organized with only one
electoral district, the city, and through plurality rule. There are several candidates
that run for election. Crucially, citizens can cast as many votes as seats are
to be filled. When voting is polarized across ethnic groups, at-large elections
do not give representation to minorities because they are outnumbered by the
majority. In contrast, in single-district elections, the city is partitioned into several
1See White v. Regester, 412 US 755 (1973).
2See Kousser (1984) for a list of discriminatory electoral methods, known in the literature as
vote-dilution techniques. He also discusses how these mechanisms work, and provides a history
of their origins, which dates back to the first Reconstruction and post-Reconstruction periods.
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electoral districts. In general, one candidate is elected from each district in a
plurality vote. Minorities are packed in a number of districts proportional to their
population share. Thus, single-districts guarantee that minorities can effectively
elect a candidate of their choice.
The findings can be summarized as follows: first, local public goods and tax
collection increase after single-districts are enacted; second, there is no effect on
intergovernmental transfers; third, cities that have to change to single-district
elections increase the fraction of black public workers and experience gains in
black population after the change. These effects are matched by similar decreases
in white and other ethnicities public workers and citizens; fourth, the growth rate
of black house values and rents increases more than that of whites. The latter
effect could be driven both by capitalization of the higher public spending and by
an increase in demand of housing by blacks.3 Fifth, I do not find crime reductions
after the changes in electoral rule, but some evidence of increases in the number of
black homicides; fifth, the changes in the city budget happen in general for all cities
no matter their level of previous discrimination, the effects being weakly stronger
for cities where discrimination had been more important in the past. Overall, this
set of results shows that electoral rules that give more proportional representation
to minorities matter for the level of public goods and for its potential distribution
across communities, as well as for the distribution of public jobs across ethnic
groups. In addition, even cities with a former strong support for segregation
change their public budgets. Last but not least, the common law system, in which
both courts and legislative bodies create law, is crucial to protect the voting rights
of minorities.
Identification in this paper exploits three main advantages offered by the quasi-
3Municipal services affect the quality of life of a community and, consequently, are capitalized
into home values (Oates, 1969; Bradbury et al., 2001). Brueckner and Joo (1991) argue that
the effect of public spending on the voter’s wealth must enter in his decision calculus along with
consumption and cost considerations. They show that the voter’s ideal level of spending is a
mixture of their preferences and those of an eventual buyer of their house. Moreover, the house
is the main asset for most families (Tracy et al, 1999) and renters seem not to oppose to increases
in local public goods (Oates, 2005).
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experiment and the data : exogenous changes, abundant variation, and a panel
dataset. Firstly, during the 1970s and 1980s many cities, specially in the South of
the US, were forced by courts to change towards single-districts electoral rules.4
This provides a unique quasi-experiment to test for the effects of electoral rules in
ethnically divided societies. The electoral reforms were related to the development
of a nationwide jurisprudence that is exogenous to local conditions that could bias
the estimates, and to any changes at the local level that could drive both the
changes in electoral rules and in policy.5 The solution proposed by the courts was
to engineer single districts in which black minorities were packed to allow them to
elect their own representatives.6
Secondly, by focusing on cities I can exploit many electoral reforms, which
in general are a rare event (Katz, 2005). The literature studying the effects of
electoral rules has mainly focused on cross-sectional or panel datasets of countries
(Persson and Tabellini, 2003; Albalate et al., 2012) to show the correlations be-
tween electoral rules and fiscal policy. Thus, the context of the US South offers
very interesting variation not only because of its exogeneity, but also because of
the abundant changes that happened.
Finally, the longitudinal nature of the cities’ public finance data allows me to
run a fixed-effects specification. Identification relies on a parallel trends assump-
tion. I provide graphical evidence of no pre-treatment trends by including leads
and lags in a dynamic specification. The evidence supports the identification as-
4I focus on cities that were forced to change to single-district elections due to a court-order
or that had some sort of external pressure to do so, such as a lawsuit. The development of
an anti-vote dilution jurisprudence implied that all cities with a sizable minority and with at-
large elections were pressured to change. Specially after being sued, since they did not have the
resources to defend themselves in court.
5Trebbi et al (2008) also focus on electoral reforms in US cities but they drop municipalities
that were court-ordered to change because their interest was on endogenous institutions. In
contrast, the sample in this paper is comprised of cities that were forced externally to change
their electoral rule, and of those that did not change it.
6Single-districts served as geographic political reservations to guarantee representation for a
historically disadvantaged community in the US. See Duflo (2004) for a review of the literature
on political reservations in India.
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sumption of parallel trends, allowing me to interpret the estimates as the causal
effect on the city budget of outlawing at-large elections.
The results can be used to discriminate between alternative theoretical mech-
anisms of the effects of electoral rules on local public goods and the distribution
of resources. First, there is a literature that argues that ethnic heterogeneity has
negative effects on public goods (Alesina and LaFerrara, 2005; Alesina et al., 1999;
Easterly and Levine, 1997). With single-district elections, the local councils be-
come more ethnically diverse.7 If that channel is operating in the local parliament,
local public goods and taxation should decrease once at-large elections are out-
lawed. Since they actually increase, ethnic heterogeneity in the city council does
not have a negative effect on public goods and taxes. The results are of interest
because very little is known about how the documented negative effects of ethnic
diversity might be mediated by the institutions that determine fiscal policy, and
how changes in their design might alleviate the problem.8 This is of special im-
portance since minorities tend to be underrepresented or even excluded (Lijhpart,
1986) in these institutions.9 The results suggest that the underprovision of pub-
lic goods is partially caused by the lack of representation that minorities suffer,
and that the underprovision disproportionally affects the members of the minority
group. Moreover, the underprovision can be made less severe if the electoral game
is designed to guarantee minority representation.
A second potential channel is related to the literature on how representatives
of geographic constituencies choose the amount of local public goods to provide.
Weingast et al. (1981) show theoretically that when a political constituency is
divided into districts, spending is higher. Moreover, they predict that the level of
spending will be higher the more districts there are. Thus, a move from at-large
7There is a large body of evidence documenting that single-districts increase black represen-
tation: Davidson and Grofman, 1994a; Trebbi et al., 2008; Valelly, 2004.
8Alesina and LaFerrara (2005) survey the literature.
9Sample comprises all cities with at least 2.5% black people or at most 40% black citizens,
which are the ones where the minority is big enough to benefit from the changes in institutions
that I study. Thus, all these cities have a certain degree of fractionalization. The results are
robust to changing the lower threshold to 5% and to moving the higher threshold up to 50%.
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elections (1 district) to single-district elections (several districts) should increase
public expenditures. In addition, the more districts are created, the more spending
and taxation should increase. I test for the latter prediction using the number of
districts created and I do not find significant differences when more districts are
created. Moreover, note that this mechanism applies for all ethnicities: the fact
that only black public workers and black population increase, and that changes in
growth rates for black house values and rents are larger, provides further evidence
to discard this channel.
The third theoretical channel to explain the empirical results is drawn from
legislative bargaining models (Baron and Ferejohn, 1989; Persson and Tabellini,
2000). A central result in this literature is that minimum winning coalitions consist
of the agenda-setter and those legislators whose support is the easiest to obtain.
Black representatives are likely to have a weak bargaining position in the council
because they will be a minority, and because it will be their first time in office.
Legislative bargaining models show that even minority groups can negotiate and
get benefits for their districts. There is also support for this mechanism from
historical sources documenting the emergence of black pragmatic leaders ready to
close deals with white politicians (Lawson, 1985). Thus, aggregate public good
spending should increase as long as that does not happen at the expense of public
goods in white districts. In that case, there should also be an increase in taxes and
an increase in local public goods targeted at black communities. Moreover, black
concilmen should also be able to improve black job finding in the public sector.
The results exploring who benefits from changes in electoral rules give support to
this mechanism: there are more black public workers and black citizens after a
change to single-districts representation. In addition, increases in growth rates of
black house values and rents are higher than those for whites.10
This paper brings together two literatures. On one hand, the impact of voting
rights statutory law on economic outcomes has been documented in the literature
10The effects on house values and rents could be driven both by capitalization of the new
public expenditures, and by an increase in demand of houses by blacks given the increase in
black population.
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(Husted and Kenny, 1997; Cascio and Washington, 2014; Naidu, 2012). On the
other hand, there is evidence of how court decisions affect economic outcomes:
Miles (2000) for effects on employment outcomes, Currie and MacLeod (2008)
and Avraham et al. (2012) for impacts of tort reforms on health care. This
paper bridges these literatures by showing how the court system affects economic
outcomes through minority voting rights protection. The main contribution of
this paper is to show the effects of a sequence of court cases, that considered that
minority voters “should enjoy an equal opportunity to coalesce effectively despite
the mandate of majority rule,” on local public goods, taxation, house values and
rents, public workers, and population sorting. The results highlight the importance
of the common law system, in which both courts and legislative bodies create the
law, to protect the voting rights of minority voters.
The second contribution of this paper is that it sheds light on why some federal
policies to end segregation might have partially failed.11 For instance, Cascio et
al. (2013) study the effects of federal grants and federally mandated desegregation
in schools, and find that black dropout was not reduced, while white dropout was.
The authors consider that a potential explanation for their result is the leeway that
local institutions have to allocate the money to schools attended by whites. At-
large elections were also in place in school district boards (Kousser, 1999; NCVR,
2006), and could have been used to divert the money to only white schools, as the
results for city budgets suggest.
Finally, I also show evidence that politics matters at the local level (Tiebout,
1956; Epple and Zelenitz, 1981; Epple and Romer, 1991). The presence of changes
in policy could be partly due to the fact that a change in electoral rule modifies
completely electoral competition and, consequently, legislative bargaining in the
council. Moreover, the anti-vote dilution jurisprudence implied that all cities were
subject to these changes, probably limiting Tiebout sorting. Thus, the change
towards single-districts is likely to have more important policy effects that changes
in mayor’s partisanship or gender.12
11See Almond et al. (forthcoming) for a study of the positive effects on black infant survival
after hospital desegregation.
12Ferreira and Gyourko (2009) and Ferreira and Gyourko (2011) show that there are no effects
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The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 I explain the details of at-large
and single-district elections and review the history of voting rights in the US. In
section 3 I provide a theoretical interpretation of the results. Section 4 describes
the data that was used. Section 5 explains the empirical strategy and shows the
results. Finally, in section 6 I conclude.
2 Electoral Rules Background
In this section I provide two types of background information relevant for the
analysis. First of all, I will describe the electoral rule used to hamper minority
representation, at-large elections, and its origins; as well as the solution engineered
to give political representation to black communities, single-districts. Secondly, I
explain the history of the prohibition of at-large elections by courts, and argue
that the court orders provide exogenous variation that allows for identification of
the effects of single-districts on economic outcomes.
2.1 At-large Elections vs. Single-Districts
At-large elections make it impossible for minorities to be represented when voting
behavior is polarized across communities.13 In this electoral system, the munici-
pality is a single constituency, and all aldermen are elected from the same district
(the city) through plurality rule. Crucially, all people who live within the city
borders can cast as many votes as seats are in the city legislature. This allows
of mayor’s partisanship and gender respectively. Gerber and Hopkins (2011) show partisanship
effects for the categories of spending over which the city has budget authority. See Glaeser (2013)
for a recent review.
13Voting behavior in the South of the US was polarized during the decades after the approval
of the VRA, and in many cases is still polarized. Black people vote for black candidates and
white people vote for white candidates. For more information see NCVRA (2006, p. 90).
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white communities to cast all votes for white candidates and fill all the positions
in the city council, making it impossible for minorities to be represented.14 Figure
1 and 2 gives an example for the City of Florence, in Alabama.
At-large elections have their origins in the first Reconstruction and post- Re-
construction era (Kousser, 1984). Their objective was to minimize the threat of
black political power efficaciously but quietly, so that there was no federal govern-
ment intervention to protect black voters. Not denying the franchise, this election
method was aimed at hampering minority representation.15 After the passage of
the VRA, at-large elections started to be enacted again with the same purposes
as in the XIXth Century. Trebbi et al. (2008) show empirical evidence of how be-
tween 1960 and 1967 cities in the South of the US where black people constituted
a minority of the population were adopting at-large elections.16 The court-orders
that I exploit created single-districts in those places that enacted at-large elections
in both the XIXth and XXth century to avoid black representation.
Single-districts enhance a more proportional representation of minorities and
were the alternative election method proposed by courts after the outlaw of at-
large elections in certain cities. This electoral structure divides the city in different
districts, each of them electing one representative by majority rule. The candidate
most voted in her district will win a seat in the council. Citizens can only cast one
vote. Due to the segregation of racial minorities, this type of electoral rule enhances
minority representation.17 In fact, the districts created for black communities can
14See Amy (1993) for a more detailed explanation of both at-large elections and single-district
elections.
15At-large elections were not the only method used to prevent minority representation. These
techniques are known as vote-dilution mechanisms in the history and political science literatures.
Kousser (1984) identifies sixteen different devices for vote dilution. See Kousser (1984) and
Davidson (1994, p. 22-24) for more details on how these other mechanisms work.
16For example, Mississippi’s legislature started in 1966 a Massive Resistance Legislation
(Parker, 1990) aimed at setting new hurdles for black officeholding after the passage of the
VRA.
17See Cutler et al. (1999) for an explanation of the dynamics of the ghetto in US. According
to them, in 1970 the average urban black lived in a neighborhood that was 68% black. In 1990
it was the case for 56% urban black (p. 456)
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be understood as geographic political reservations for black candidates because
they were designed to contain enough black population so that they would be able
to elect black representatives. The widespread use of single-districts in the second
half of the XXth Century was possible thanks to the VRA and several court-orders
that I explain in the next subsection (Davidson and Grofman, 1994).
Finally, mixed-systems combine features of both at-large and single-district
elections. Some candidates will run for the city-constituency (at-large) and some
will run for one of the districts partitioning the municipality (single-district). For
instance, in a city with seven aldermen, four might be elected through at-large
elections and three might be elected through single-district elections.
2.2 The Creation of Single-Districts
Single-districts were created in many US cities thanks to the VRA and several
court-orders that simplified the judicial process necessary to outlaw at-large elec-
tions and implement single-districts. In this section I will detail the history behind
the sources of variation I exploit, and argue and show evidence that a fixed-effects
specification will be able to capture the causal effects of single-districts on spending
and taxation.
The legal starting point to ban at-large elections is section 2 of the VRA,
which prohibits practices that discriminate on the basis of race.18 Its initial in-
terpretation made that the first lawsuits had to prove that at-large elections had
a discriminatory intent. This supposed a burdensome requirement that made it
very difficult to win a case. However, the burden of proof required was about to be
simplified significantly by some court-orders that influenced the following lawsuits
and changes in electoral rules. In a nutshell, these lawsuits listed several factors
that were enough to prove indirectly that the election system had a discriminatory
intent. With the adoption of an easier to proof results-based test, plaintiffs had to
18The exact wording is: “No voting qualifications or prerequisite to voting, or standard, prac-
tice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision to deny or
abridge the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color.”
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prove a history of discrimination in the specific jurisdiction and the discriminatory
consequences of the dilutive procedures.
The first cases to simplify the proof requirements to be brought to court were
White v. Regester (1973) and Zimmer v. McKeithen (1973).19 They are the first
two landmark cases for the creation of a national anti-vote dilution jurisprudence.
As can be seen in figure 3, before 1973 there are barely changes in electoral rules,
whereas the number of changes peaks for first time after these court-orders. De-
spite these first advances, the White-Zimmer framework was demolished when the
Supreme Court (Mobile v. Bolden, 1980) asserted that “the XVth Amendment
does not entail the right to have Negro candidates elected”.20 Figure 3 shows how
after 1980 the number of changes decreases until being zero in 1982. However, in
1982 the VRA had to be renewed by the US Congress and Senate, and knowing
the difficulties that Mobile v. Bolden imposed for plaintiffs seeking to dismantle
vote-dilutive devices, section 2 was amended to incorporate the White-Zimmer
framework. In addition, the Senate Judiciary Committee wrote a report listing
several factors that courts could use to decide whether a particular device had a
discriminatory effect prohibited by section 2.21 The Senate factors became very
influential for the courts interpretation of the VRA and reduced the uncertainty
about the burden of proof that was necessary to show by plaintiffs to win a case.
After the amendment of the VRA the number of changes from at-large elections
to single-district systems peaks again. Finally, Thornburg v. Gingles (1986) sim-
plified even further the anti-vote dilution jurisprudence. We can see in figure 3
how the changes in electoral rules peak again after 1986.22
Thus, the development of a national anti-vote dilution jurisprudence originated
19See White v. Regester, 412 US 755 (1973) and Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th
Cir. 1973).
20See Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
21The factors are: a history of official discrimination, the presence of vote polarization across
racial lines, the usage of potentially discriminatory voting practices, the denial to minorities
to participate in the candidate slating process, the presence of discrimination in education,
employment and health; a history of racial appeals in political campaigns, and the extent to
which members of a minority have been elected to public office in the jurisdiction.
22See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
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the changes towards single-districts. New election methods were not enacted be-
cause of voluntary agreement between the ethnicities of each city, but because
of external forces. This provides a compelling justification for a difference-in-
differences strategy because it is unlikely that the changes in electoral rules hap-
pen after significant changes in local economic and political conditions that would
violate the parallel trends assumption . In order to further test for the identifying
assumption, in section 5 I run dynamic specifications including leads and lags.
None of the leads are significantly different from zero, and there is no evidence
of any pre-treatment trend. These results provide evidence of the validity of the
empirical strategy and allow to interpret the effects of changes to single-districts
on expenditures and taxation as causal.23 Moreover, the differential timing of the
changes provides evidence ruling out the possibility that another common shock
to the treated municipalities is driving the results.
Another relevant question is what are the reasons behind the differential timing
of changes. It would be worrisome for the identification strategy if the time of
adoption of single-districts was correlated with city characteristics. I run a test
for joint significance of the year of change with several city variables and I do not
find any evidence pointing to a relationship between the year in which a change
happens and some city characteristics. For only two of the variables the test of
joint significance is significant at the 5% level. Results are summarized in figure
4. 24
Finally, what guaranteed that after a change to single-districts the cities did
not adopt other methods to hamper black representation? This was achieved by
Section 5 of the VRA, which requires that any election system change in certain
covered jurisdictions has to be submitted to the Department of Justice for pre-
clearance.25 Submitting jurisdictions have to show that the modifications do not
23See Acemoglu (2005) for a critique of empirical political economy research dealing with the
identification problem using selection on observables and exclusion restriction methods.
24The specification for the test of joint significance is: yi = α+
∑1990
j=1970 βjChangeji + i.
25The covered jurisdictions are Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi,
and South Carolina were fully covered by section 5. Texas and Virginia were also covered with
the exception of some counties. There are also scattered counties and townships covered.
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have a racial discriminatory purpose or effect. Thus, section 5 was essential to
limit the extension of new dilutive practices.26 Thus, the combination of section
2 and 5 of the VRA with several court-orders allowed a stable shift in minority
representation.27
The implementation of single-districts increased black representation (David-
son and Grofman, 1994; Trebbi et al. 2008; Welch, 1990).28 Figure 5 shows the
difference between the percentage of black voting-age people and the proportion of
black local representatives. As can be seen, there are gains in local representation.
The most important ones happen in Alabama, Mississippi, Lousiana, Georgia and
South Carolina.
To sum up, the creation of single-districts in the US during the 1970s and 1980s
was related to the development of a national anti-vote dilution jurisprudence. The
exogeneity of the changes and the lack of pre-treatment trends (proved in section
5) give reassurance that a fixed-effects specification will capture the causal effect
of electoral rules on local public good spending and taxation.
3 Theoretical Interpretation
There are three channels that predict different effects on local public good expen-
ditures and taxes. In this section, I explain each of them, as well as the different
repercussions that they have for the distribution of spending across ethnic com-
munities. Each model provides implications that I test in the empirical section to
give evidence of the mechanism driving the results.
26In Allen v. State Board of Elections (1969), the Supreme Court gave a broad interpretation
to the coverage of section 5, meaning that even minor changes or those affecting voting indirectly
had to be submitted for preclearance.
27This is an important feature of the changes to single-districts given the degree of institutional
persistence in the South of the US. See Acemoglu and Robinson (2006 and 2008).
28This is a well-known result in the literature and that is why I do not focus on it. Instead, I
explore the budgetary and distributional consequences of changes in electoral rules.
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The first potential mechanism is related to the link between ethnic heterogene-
ity and public good provision. A negative effect of ethnic diversity on public good
provision has been documented in the literature (Alesina et al., 1999; Easterly and
Levine, 1997; Miguel, 2004). Alesina et al. (1999) argue that representatives of
ethnic groups value only the benefits of local public goods that are concentrated
in their community and discount the benefits that accrue to other groups. This
leads to underprovision of local public goods since not all their positive effects are
taken into account, and the population prefers to pay less taxes and devote these
resources to private goods rather than public goods.
The question of interest for us is whether this channel applies after a change to
single-districts. Since at-large elections exclude the minority and single-districts
guarantee its representation, the local parliament will become more diverse racially.
In addition, electoral competition will be organized through ethnic representatives
and ethnic constituencies, emphasizing the fact that representatives only value the
benefits they provide to their community. Then, following Alesina et al. (1999)
we expect to see that the level of public spending and taxes goes down.
A critical assumption in Alesina et al. (1999) is that politicians discount the
benefits that public goods provide to other constituencies. However, this might
not necessarily be the case. The second channel is developed by Weingast et al.
(1981), who model how representatives of geographic constituencies decide over
the amount of local public goods to provide. They show that when the political
constituency is divided into districts, the level of spending is higher. This happens
because the electoral districts create a divergence between the political benefits
and costs of each local public good when taxes are the same across districts.
Thus, a change from at-large (1 district) to single-districts (several districts) should
increase public expenditures. Moreover, Weingast et al. (1981) also predict that
the level of spending will be higher the more districts there are.29 Consequently, if
that is the mechanism, the increases in spending should be higher the more districts
the city has. Note that the mechanism applies no matter who gains representation
29See Baqir (2002) for empirical evidence supporting this result based on a cross-section of US
cities in 1992.
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and its ethnicity. Thus, we should expect that the increases in local public goods
happen in all districts and that it is capitalized into both white- and black-owned
house, and in the rents both groups pay. In addition, changes in public workers
and population should be of similar size for both communities.
A last channel is based on models of legislative bargaining, such as Baron and
Ferejohn (1989)30, that predict that minimum winning coalitions emerge among
the agenda-setter and those legislators whose support is the easiest to obtain.
Since blacks will get representation for first time after a change towards single-
districts, and they will only hold a minority of the seats, they are likely to hold a
weak bargaining position in the council. However, precisely because of that weak
position, they can manage to be part of the minimum winning coalition.31 Thus,
the weak representation power gained by black minorities allows them to influence
the level of provision of public goods and its distribution. Self-interested white
politicians had a new companion that, given the low levels of investment in his
neighborhood, was easier to please and to obtain his support for other policies.
That is in stark contrast with at-large elections, when black communities had no
representatives in the council and thus had no role in budget bargaining within the
council. Consequently, if blacks manage to increase spending in their districts, and
that does not happen at the expense of white districts, the level of provision should
increase and its distribution should be more favorable to black communities. In
that case, we should expect that capitalization of public goods into home values
happens only in black districts and not in white neighborhoods.
There is also some support for that mechanism from historical sources. Lawson
(1985) explains that in a scenario of white-supremacist majorities, black politicians
had to necessarily forgo their legitimate grievances to get support for their policies
from white legislators. Kenneth Clark sums up the attitude necessary for successful
policy change: “The Negro political official must assume the additional burdens
inherent in defining politics as requiring a tough-minded and realistic appraisal
of the power available to him, a determination to obtain and use effectively the
30See also Persson and Tabellini (2000) for a review.
31Austen-Smith and Banks (1988) show that in a parliamentary setting the smallest party will
always be included in the coalition since their support is the cheapeast to obtain.
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power necessary to effect a desired and observable change, and balance this by
a stable, deep, and broad sense of human values.”32 In the transition from civil
rights to electoral competition, black communities turned from leaders with a more
radical vision to more pragmatic leaders, or as stated by Lawson (1985, p. 267), to
politicians “who practiced politics as the art of the possible around the bargaining
table.” At the same time, white politicians were interested in promoting rapid
industrial growth in the South. By joining this alliance, black politicians were
able to provide benefits to their communities (Lawson, 1985). Thus, the rise of
more pragmatic elected black leaders gave black communities the clout needed to
benefit from the distribution of local public goods.
4 Data and Main Variables
I construct a unique panel dataset of 126 cities from 1970 until 2000 with both
data of the creation of single-districts, government finances, home values and rents
by race, public workers by race, and sorting by race. This dataset allows me to
look at whether public good provision changes after single-districts are enacted,
and to learn who benefits from these changes by looking at capitalization effects,
the fraction of public workers of each race, and population movements. In this
section I present the datasets, provide descriptive statistics, and explain the main
independent and dependent variables that I use.
The sample is restricted to cities in which blacks were enough people to have
their own single-district (more than 2.5% of population) and not a majority of
the city inhabitants (less than 40% of population).33 The reason to justify such
sample selection stems from the findings in Trebbi et al. (2008): during the 1960s,
around the years when blacks would regain their right to vote thanks to the VRA,
cities that had a black minority switched their election system to at-large elections
32Lawson (1985, p. 267).
33The results are both robust to changing the lower threshold to 5% and to moving the higher
threshold up to 50%.
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to difficult black representation. On the other hand, cities in which blacks were a
majority, the council switched to single-districts to minimize their representation.
Thus, is in cities in which blacks are a minority in which we should expect that the
electoral rule matters the most to obtain minimal representation.34 If the political
representatives of the 1960s hurried up to change the system of representation is
probably because they feared that black representation would change the way in
which the city was ruled, and the distribution of public services and public jobs
across communities.35 It is therefore in this cities were single-districts should make
a difference.
I collect data on local government revenues, expenditures, employment, and
population from the Census of Governments. This dataset contains yearly infor-
mation for the largest cities and every 5 years for all local governments. To take
advantage of high frequency data, I keep in the sample cities for which there is
data every year. All the financial data is deflated using as a base year 2005.36
If we want to understand the effects of single-districts on the city budget,
we should use as outcome variables those categories of spending in which local
governments do not share authority with other level of governments (federal, state,
and local).37 Table 1 shows the eight main categories in which municipalities
spend money. The first column shows the mean of the budget share of each item.
The second and third columns are the mean of the spending per capita and the
34In cities with a black majority and single-districts, blacks can elect representatives propor-
tionally, as well as whites. In that case, the switch to single-districts from at-large elections
passed by the political representatives was to ensure that whites maintained some representation
despite being a minority.
35Trebbi et al. (2008) also show that such strategic behavior happened between 1970 and 2000.
However, their sample is comprised of cities that were not court-ordered to change their electoral,
since their focus is on endogenous institutions. In contrast, I focus on externally enforced changes
to study effects on the public budget and the distribution of resources across ethnicities.
36The deflator is from the Bureau of Labor and Statistics.
37Ferreira and Gyourko (2009) study whether partisanship matter at the city level. They
use aggregate expenditure variables and do not find any significant effect. Gerber and Hopkins
(2011) follow the same empirical strategy, but disaggregate the spending categories and find that
partisanship does matter for fire and police protection, two of the budget items in which cities
have total authority.
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mean of the ratio between the amount of intergovernmental transfers and direct
expenditures by the local government. Low levels of this ratio reflect the budget
items that are decided at the city council. According to table 1, local politics
will matter for local public goods such as police and fire protection, sewerage and
parks.38 39 It is in these categories that we should expect to see effects of changing
the electoral rule to guarantee minority representation.40 Finally, the last column
shows how most of the money spent on roads, local hospitals and public housing
comes from transfers, implying that municipalities have at most small influence
on these policies. Thus, from now on, I will refer as local public good spending
the sum of fire, police, park, and sewage expenditures (LPG). In terms of taxes,
municipalities can fix the property tax rate and can change part of the sales tax
rate. These are the main sources of own revenue and I will refer to them as
Local taxes. I will also look for effects in the number of workers in the local public
good sector.
Data on changes in electoral rule and year of the change is obtained from
Davidson and Grofman (1994). Their dataset is available at the Interuniversity
Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) and contains 241 cities in
the southern states of Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina,
South Carolina, Texas and Virginia. For 74 of these cities I have yearly financial
38For utilities, police and fire protection, and parks there does not exist a category of transfers.
That is why the ratio is 0. Even if I added all the transfers earmarked for other purposes and the
transfers for general local government support and divided it by the sum of spending in utilities,
police and fire protection, and parks, the ratio is of 0.0001517.
39The absence of intergovernmental transfers for these categories is also reassuring that there
is no crowding out of local government spending in these budget items because of federal or state
grants. See Bradford and Oates (1971, a,b) for a theoretical analysis of how intergovernmen-
tal transfers can crowd out government spending and Knight (2002) for empirical evidence of
crowding out using exogenous variation in delegation political power.
40Even if the level of intergovernmental transfers spent in utilities is zero, we should not expect
changes on this policy because of changes in the electoral rule. Local utilities are managed by
public and private firms. Then, local governments do not have complete authority over this
policy either. Moreover, households pay for the utilities used through fees or taxes that target
each household according to the amount consumed, so that there is no space for transfers across
households depending on who pays a service and who actually benefits from it.
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data. I expand the sample with 52 cities with data from the International City
Managers Association (ICMA) surveys on the municipal form of government for
the years 1981, 1986, 1991, 1996, and 2001. The surveys contained questions about
the number of aldermen elected by single district. Out of the 52 cities, 12 changed
their electoral rule and 40 did not change its election system. The variable of
interest is Change, a dummy indicating whether a city had to change its electoral
rule.
In order to understand who benefits from the changes in expenditures I will use
house values, rents, public workers, and population disaggregated by race. These
were downloaded from the National Historical Geographic Information System
at www.nhgis.org. The data on public workers contains all public workers that
live in the city, not only those who work for the city.41 I also use crime data
disaggregated by race to explore whether there was a decline in homicides after a
change in electoral rule. The data is from the Uniform Crime Reports of the FBI,
and it contains the number of murders that happened in each city, differentiating
both for the race of both the victim and the offender.
I also got from NHGIS the main control variables: population by race, share
of old people, number of rooms in each house by race, and the year in which the
house was built by race.
Table 2 shows summary statistics for both the treatment and control group
in 1970 and 2000. The main difference between cities that had to change their
electoral rule and those that did not have to is that the former are located mostly
in the US South. This is not surprising given the different history of discrimi-
nation of blacks in the southern states. The percentage of aldermen elected by
single-districts changed dramatically between 1970 and 2000 for treated cities as a
consequences of the court orders and lawsuits. By 2000, 87.8% of local politicians
were elected by single-districts, compared to none in 1970 Note also that some
cities switched to a mixed system with some aldermen still elected citywide, since
41Despite city representatives having the most to say about city public workers, they might
still be able to influence who gets hired at other levels of governments: they can announce job
openings in their communities, propose candidates, and make sure that the hiring process is fair.
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the percentage is not 100 in 2000. The descriptive statistics also show that the
treatment cities are larger and have a bigger fraction of black population. Blacks
also live in cheaper houses and pay lower rents than whites. It is also worthy to
point out the important changes in black public workers between 1970 and 2000
in cities that had to change their electoral rule. Finally, cities that had to switch
to single-districts spent and collected less taxes than cities in the control group.
These differences, however, are much smaller in 2000 than in 1970. The summary
statistics show important differences between cities in the treatment and control
group. However, identification relies in the parallel trends assumption. In section
5 I provide evidence of no significant pre-treatment trends.
As is shown in table 2, most of the sample is composed of cities in the South of
the US. This is natural since most black people live in the Southern states. Almost
20% of the people in these cities were black. The median black house value was
lower than the median white house value, reflecting the disadvantaged economic
condition of blacks in the US. The share of aldermen elected by single-districts in
1970 was less than 7%, reflecting the widespread use of discriminatory electoral
rules. In 2000, this share was 66%, a sharp rise caused by the combined force of
the VRA and the courts.
In order to construct measures of discrimination at the county level and test for
the mechanisms that are driving the results, I use the electoral vote that George
Wallace obtained as a presidential candidate in 1968 when he ran with a segrega-
tionist platform (Clubb et al., 2006). As a second proxy for discrimination I use
data of the number of black people lynched in each county between 1900 and 1930
from the Historical American Lynching Data Collection Project. 42
Property tax limits data is from the Advisory Commision on Intergovernmen-
tal Relations (ACIR, 1995). It is a variable that identifies if the state government
imposed any tax limitation for the local governments. Since the endogenous vari-
ables are public expenditures it is important to control for this variable because
property tax limits reduce public spending and affect house prices through that
channel (Bradbury et al., 2001).
42See http://http://people.uncw.edu/hinese/HAL/HAL%20Web%20Page.htm
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5 Empirical Strategy and Results
In this section I will explain the empirical strategy and the results. The em-
pirical strategy has four parts: firstly I use a difference-in-difference strategy to
show that minority representation increases local public good provision, taxes, and
public employment in the local public good sector. The increases in local public
goods happen mainly in fire protection. These results rule out the first poten-
tial mechanism: that heterogeneity of preferences decreases always public good
provision. Secondly, I test whether the effects are stronger the more districts are
created. I show that it is not the case and discard that the results are driven by
a common-pool problem. Thirdly, if black representatives were able to influence
decision-making, there should be changes in the fraction of black public workers
and black citizens. Changes in black population should also increase black house
values and rents if housing supply does not keep up with demand. Moreover, if
the increases in local public goods are targeted to black neighborhoods should also
be capitalized into black house values and rents. The results are consistent with
black representation benefiting mostly minorities. These results point to blacks’
new legislative bargaining power as being effective in changing policy. Fourthly,
I use proxies for the level of hostility that blacks faced in their cities to explore
if the effects also happen for cities that faced high discrimination in the past.
The changes in the public budget are of similar size regardless of the past level of
discrimination, and for some variables slightly stronger in places that were more
hostile to blacks. Overall, this set of results shows that electoral rules that give
more proportional representation to minorities matter for the level of public goods
and its distribution across ethnic groups. Moreover, the court system plays a cru-
cial role in guaranteeing an equal access to public resources for minorities through
protecting their voting rights.
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5.1 Effects on Local Public Goods and Taxes
I implement a difference-in-difference strategy, controlling for city and year fixed
effects, county-linear trends, as well as time-varying control variables. In addition,
I report results omitting the county linear trend. City fixed effects control for all
constant municipal characteristics that could be correlated with expenditures in
local public goods, including geographic features and historical features of the local
government. Year fixed effects control for local public good spending shocks that
are common to all cities in a given year, like those related to national economic
and political factors. County-linear trends control for trends in the endogenous
variable that are common at the county level. The main specification is:
yit = α + β1Changeit + γtXi1970 + δi + θt + ωc ∗ yeart + µit (1)
where δi are the city fixed effects and θt are the year fixed effects, and ωc ∗ yeart
is the county linear trend. yit are public spending and local taxes variables in
logs per capita. Xi1970 is a vector of baseline characteristics that contains the
log of population, which controls for the size of the city and for its economic
growth;43 the share of old people, which controls for the effect on public spending
of an elderly population; the share of black people, which controls for the size of
the main racial minority; and a dummy variable for the presence of property tax
limits, which controls for potential effects on local public goods of tax limits. β1
is our coefficient of interest. It captures the effect of outlawing at-large elections
and enacting single-districts on local public good spending or local taxes.
Table 3 shows that the changes towards single-districts increase local public
good provision and local public good employment. Spending per capita in local
public goods increases by 5-7%, and local public good employment per capita
increases by 4-5.7%. The coefficients of the main regressor are statistically sig-
nificant, except for when the dependent variable is LPG and the specification
43Within a country, labor is free to move across cities. Since people migrate according to growth
opportunities, population captures the extent to which a city has become more attractive for
economic reasons. See Glaeser et al. (1995) for a study of economic growth across cities.
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includes county linear trends, in which the coefficient is marginally insignificant
at the 10% level. Table 4 show the results on public revenues: the change from
at-large elections to single-districts increases only local tax collection, and does not
affect transfers from other levels of government. The increase in tax collection per
capita is between 5-9%. Note that the size of the effects both on the expenditure
and revenue side are of similar size. If cities had to finance the new spending they
had to do so either by an increase in taxes, transfers, or debt. They do so through
the first channel. The results show a positive effect on local public goods and
tax collection of non-discriminatory electoral rules. So far, we can conclude that
ethnic heterogeneity in the city council does not decrease public expenditures, as
has been documented in other contexts (Alesina et al., 1999; Easterly and Levine,
1997). Thus, minority representation guaranteed through single-districts might
play a role in alleviating public good underprovision, an issue largely unknown in
the literature (Alesina and LaFerrara, 2005).
Table 5, panel A shows that when I disaggregate by spending categories the
effect is driven by increases in fire spending. Panel B shows similars results when
I disaggregate the categories of public employment. The results show that the
increases in city expenditures are driven by a rise in fire protection services. This
raises the question of why fire expenditures are the only ones increasing after a
change towards single-districts, but not police, parks and sewage. There is evi-
dence from several sources that fire protection was an important issue for black
communities in the US South. For instance, in Hawkins v. Town of Shaw Missis-
sippi the plaintiffs won a case proving that the town of Shaw provided municipal
services in a discriminatory manner. Black areas suffered from an underprovision
of fire hydrants and low water pressure. The same kind of anecdotal evidence
regarding fire hydrants is provided by Button (1989, p.120) , who studies cities in
Florida. Moreover, Button (1989) also documents that physical divisions between
white and black neighborhood reduced the effectiveness of fire protection in black
neighborhoods. In some of the cities in his sample, white and black communities
were divided by railroad tracks, which sometimes impeded fire trucks to access
black neighborhoods when there was a fire. In two out of six cities studied in his
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book, once black elected officials gained representation in the city council, they
pushed successfully for the construction of fire stations in black areas. There is
also evidence of fire departments ran by members of the Ku Klux Klan in Georgia
(US House Subcommittee on the Constitution of the Committee on the Judiciary,
2005), which let homes in black communities burn for a long period before any
action was taken.44 Finally, black areas are more prone to fire because of old and
dilapidated housing (Button, 1989). In fact, even today blacks are disproportion-
ately affected by fire deaths: they represent 13% of the population but account for
22% of fire deaths (FEMA, 2009).
Why does not spending on police, parks and sewage increase? Firstly, recall
that the public finance data is at the city level. Thus, it could be the case that
there are no increases but that there is a reallocation of resources within the city.
However, the data does not allow to test for that. Button (1989) also documents
racial discrimination in the provision of these services. With respect to police
protection, “the historical legacy of police brutality and a double standard of justice
instilled deep-seated fears and hatred of the police in many blacks.”45 Thus, it is
plausible that black elected officials were not interested in promoting more police
protection until blacks did not suffer from police discrimination. In order to test
if potential changes in the allocation of police services across city districts affected
homicides, I will later test wheter changes towards single-districts reduced the
number of homicides by race.
Park and sewage were also public services in which blacks were discriminated.
Button (1989) explains that blacks lived in districts with no parks, or very small
and not well-maintained recreational areas. Likewise, black neighborhoods had
worse water drainage and sewage systems. There could also be a change in the
allocation of resources between districts, but the data does not allow to test for
that. However, cities’ public budget is rather limited by economic competition
between them and constraints on their ability to raise revenue (Ladd and Yinger,
1989). In a study of the impact of partisanship in cities’ budget, Gerber and
44See page 510 of the report for more information .
45Button (1989, p. 115).
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Hopkins (2011) find it only matters for fire and police protection. Thus, I interpret
the zero result on park and sewage spending as a consequence of the limited budget
that cities have.
As a robustness test of the main results, I run a placebo regression. The results
are shown in table 6. I use a sample of cities that did not change their electoral
rule during this period. I simulate 1000 distributions of changes in electoral rules
similar to the actual one (figure 3), and I run the same regressions as in the main
specification.46 The mean coefficient of the 1000 simulations is always insignificant
and very close to zero. I obtain the same results when instead of using a fake
distribution similar to the actual one I use a uniform distribution to generate
placebo changes in electoral rules.
I use a dynamic specification to show that the results are not driven by pre-
treatment trends. A potential concern is that there could be a preexisting trend so
that local public good expenditures started increasing before the court order. The
high frequency of the local finance data allows for the inclusion of leads and lags
in the regression to show reassuring evidence that that was not the case. I include
5 leads and 5 lags, omitting the time period -1, the year before any change to
single-districts happens. Thus, the dynamic coefficients show the change in local
public spending with respect to the year before the change in electoral rule. The
specification is as follows:






βkChangeit+k + γtXi1970 + δi + θt + µit (2)
Figures 6a to 6e show that there is no pre-treatment trend and that the pos-
itive and significant effects happen some years after the change. They plot the
coefficients of the dynamic specification when the dependent variable is LPG,
LPGEmp., Local taxes, and fire protection spending and employment. The pre-
treatment coefficients have confidence bands that are quasi symmetric around 0,
confirming the absence of a pre-treatment trend. However, there is an insignifi-
46To increase the sample size of the placebos, I include cities with more than 40% and less
than 2.5% of black population.
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cant jump upwards for LPG and LPGEmp. two periods before the change that
might show some anticipation effects. The changes in electoral rules normally hap-
pen some years after the city has been sued. Local politicians, knowing that the
changes were inexorable, could have started modifying the city budget to suit their
new interests.47 Regarding the lagged coefficients, its range of values is consistent
with the results of the static specification. There are immediate positive effects
after a change, though not yet significant. Further significant increases happen
3-4 years after the change for LPG, whereas the increases happen smoothly over
time for the rest of the variables. The peak of the effect for all variables except
employment in the fire sector happens 3-4 years after single-districts are externally
enforced.
As a robustness check, I run placebo dynamic regressions following the same
approach as outlined above for the static specification. Figures 7a to 7e show
the results. As can be seen, the coefficient is always very close to zero and the
confidence intervals are symmetric around zero. In addition, I show in figures 8a to
8e the estimated effect for three percentiles of the distribution of estimates ranked
by the size of the estimate of the fourth lag.48 The actual estimates are similar or
above the estimate of the 97.5 percentile, providing evidence that the probability
that the results are obtained by chance is small.
Thus, the empirical results show a positive and significant relationship between
Change and local public good expenditures and local taxes. There is no evidence
of pre-treatment trends and the placebo regressions do not show any effect. There-
fore, single-districts created to give to the black minority political representation
increase local public good provision. Thus political institutions can make under-
provision less severe and it is not always the case that ethnic divisions decrease
public expenditures and taxes. It is yet unknown what is the channel driving the
47For example, in Alabama, a court-ordered change in a county electoral system originated
a new lawsuit affecting many of its local jurisdictions. The prospects for maintaining at-large
elections were very low. Thus, city councilmen could react with some anticipation to protect
their seats.
48I pick the fourth lag because it is were the effects become significant for the actual distribution
of changes.
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results. As exposed in section 3, it could be that the rise in public expenditures
and tax collection is driven either by a common-pool problem or by the legislative
power that black communities obtain with single-districts. In the following sec-
tions I will show evidence against the first channel and consistent with the second
one.
5.2 Are the Effects Stronger the More Districts Are Cre-
ated? Testing the Common-Pool Hypothesis
Weingast et al. (1981) predict that public spending increases with the number of
electoral districts that a political jurisdiction has. Moreover, the increase is pos-
itively monotonic in the number of districts. Thus, if the reason why we observe
a rise in local public good spending and tax collection is due to a common-pool
problem, we should see that the effects are stronger the more districts the city cre-
ated. I test that hypothesis by focusing only on cities that changed their electoral






#Districtsitk is a dummy equal to 1 if the city has k districts. G refers to
the set of cities that created 5 or more districts grouped in the following way,
G = {5 − 6 districts, 7 − 8 districts, 9 ormore}. Thus, I include three groups in
the regression, and its coefficients have to be interpreted relative to the effect on
cities that created 4 or less districts. In figures 9a to 9e I plot the coefficients
β2k. The figures do not show a positive monotonic relationship between changes
in public spending, public employment, taxation, fire spending or fire protection
employment with respect to the number of districts. Only for tax collection, cities
that create 7-8 districts have larger increases, but the coefficient drops for those
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cities with 9 or more districts. Overall, the results point to a similar effects regard-
less of the number of districts created. These findings are against the increases
happening through a common-pool channel. In the next section, I provide fur-
ther evidence against that mechanism and in favor of the rise being caused by the
legislative power that blacks enjoy with single-districts.
5.3 Who Benefits? Evidence from Housing Values, Rents,
Public Workers, Sorting, and Crime
I have shown that changes towards single-districts elections increase local public
good provision and tax collection. However, such increases might not benefit
blacks even after they gained representation, if those new local public goods are
not targeted to them. Since the public finance data is at the city level, it does not
allow to test for changes in its distribution within the city.
Nevertheless, if single-districts representation benefited mostly blacks we should
observe further changes in variables like house values, rents, the fraction of black
public workers, the fraction of black population in the city, and a decrease of mur-
ders of black people. If black representatives were able to influence policy-making,
more blacks should move to the city, maybe attracted by the improved local public
goods, or because they found a job in the public sector. Very important might
have been the ability of black local politicians to provide black communities with
public jobs. Button (1989) explains how black representatives encouraged minor-
ity members to apply for public jobs in the city, specially in the fire and police
departments.
Changes in the population should also be reflected in house values and rents as
long as the housing supply is not flexible enough to match the demand. Note also,
that if the increased fire protection was mostly targeted to black neighborhoods,
it could also capitalize into house values and rents. It is beyond the scope of this
paper to test for the exact causal chain of effects. Moreover, they are likely to
be intertwined, making identification very difficult. Instead, I will focus on the
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reduced form effect of a change in electoral in each of these variables.
I use decadal data from the US Census to learn about who benefits from single-
districts representation. I first difference the data , and look for the effects with
different window sizes. I first pool all decades, and then show results for 10, 20,
and 30 years differences. I increase the window of time and not focus only on short-
run effects because it is likely that such distributional effects take time to happen.
This comes with a caveat, as I increase the window of time, it is more likely that
the coefficient captures the effects of other changes on cities’ house values and
rents, as well as on public workers and sorting behavior. However, all the effects
appear in the specification in which I pool all decades and the one for a 10 year
window, providing supportive evidence of a causal interpretation. The more long-
run estimates can be interpreted as suggestive evidence of the overall effect of
guaranteeing minority representation on house values and rents, the fraction of
black and white public workers, and the fraction of population of each ethnicity.
The specification is as follows:
4yit = β14Changeit + γ4Xit +4µit (4)
dependent variables are the first difference of the log of black and white median
house value, log of mean black and white rent, the fraction of public workers of
each ethnicity who live in the city, and the fraction of people of each race living
in the city. For the variables in logs, the coefficients have to be interpreted as
the effects on the growth rate. For those dependent variables that are fractions,
the coefficients are the effect of the change on the fraction of public workers or
population of each race.
Table 7 shows the coefficients of Change for each dependent variable. Cities
that changed towards single-distrcts experienced a 2.42% increase in the fraction
of black public workers in the short-run (10 years), and a decrease in the fraction
of public workers of white and other ethnicities. Results are similar for the fraction
of each population group: the fraction of blacks increases by 2.77%. The growth
rate of the black median house increases by 5.1%, whereas the coefficient for white
houses is negative and not significant. For black and white rents, both coefficients
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are positive and significant, but that of black rents is significantly larger. The
results are very similar when I pool all decades.
With respect to longer windows of time, the coefficients have the same sign
and remain significant. The effects in the long-run (30 years) indicate an increase
in the fraction of black public workers of 6% and of 8% for the fraction black
citizens. Regarding the growth rate of black house values, it increases by 16%.
The growth rate of white house values is also positive and significant in the long-
run, but smaller than that for blacks. The coefficient for black rents remains
similar indicating an increase of 31.4% increase in the growth rate of black rents,
whereas that for white rents is of 15.3%.
It remains to know whether black representation had any effect on crime. Black
communities could have also benefited from the change towards single-districts if
their neighborhoods experienced a decline in crime, both as victims and offenders.
I run specification 1 using as dependent variables the number of homicides per
capita in each city, as well as the number of homicides differentiating between the
race of both the victim and the offender.
Results are shown in tables 8 and 9. Cities that changed their electoral rule
did not experience any increase in the overall number of murders, and murders in
which the victim was white. They did however experience increases in murders for
which the victim was black (though the coefficient is not significant when I do not
include a trend). Results in table 9 are consistent with those just described. There
are no increases for cases when the victim was white, both for when the offender
was either white or black. The rise in homicides in which the victim was black is
driven by murders in which the offender was also black. As before, though, the
coefficient is not significant when the specification does not include a trend. Thus,
results do not suggest that police spending was reallocated between districts. The
absence of drops in the number of black homicides could reflect the limited ability
to bargain that blacks had given their minority condition. Also, the increase in
black homicides could reflect the increase in black population in cities that enacted
single-districts.
The results show evidence consistent with black representatives being able to
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influence some policy decisions and benefit black communities. Cities with single-
districts experience higher increases in black public workers and population, as well
as on black house values and rents. This is consistent with the blacks exploiting
their new bargaining position in the council, despite its condition of minority, as
predicited by legislative bargaining models. It is also consistent with historical
evidence that elected black officials had a pro-bargaining attitude despite the the
history of discrimination in the US South (Lawson, 1985). There is though no
evidence of drops in blacks homicides, but a positive increase in cities that adopted
single-districts.
5.4 Heterogeneity
In this section I will show that the effects are of similar size for all cities no matter
what was their level of previous discrimination. In order to do that, I will use
a variable that proxies for the level of hostility that blacks faced in each city:
the support that George Wallace obtained in the 1968 presidential election at
the county level when he ran for president with a segregationist platform. The






where WallaceSupportck is a dummy equal to 1 if in the county c Wallace’s elec-
toral support was between k and k − 10 of the % of votes casted. I omit cat-
egory k = 10. Thus, all the coefficients β2k show the effect of the interaction
Changeit ∗WallaceSupportck with respect to those places where support for Wal-
lace was between 0% and 10% of the votes. In both specifications I cluster the
standard errors at the county level. Significance does not change if I cluster at the
city level.
Graphs 10a-10e show the ρ2k coefficients and its 95% confidence intervals
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for the five main dependent variables, LPG, Local taxes, LPGemp., Fire and
FireEmp. There are no significant effects for Local Taxes. For the case of LPG
and LPGemp., the graphs show significantly larger effects where most voters sup-
ported Wallace, but the evidence is not as clear-cut for Fire and FireEmp.. Also,
for municipalities in counties where Wallace obtained between 10 and 20% of the
votes, the effect is significant when the dependent variable is LPG. Overall, the ev-
idence points that the effects on spending and taxes are of equal size no matter the
past level of discrimination in the city, with the effects being only weakly stronger
for places that had more discrimination. This highlights that the court-orders
were effective in benefiting black neighborhoods even in the most pro-segregation
areas.49
6 Conclusions
This paper measures the effects of the creation of a national jurisprudence, to-
gether by courts and the legislative body, to outlaw discriminatory election meth-
ods. Section 2 of the VRA prohibited electoral discriminatory practises on the
basis of race. This triggered a series of court-orders that forced cities to change
their election systems. I exploit these changes to study the effects on local public
goods, taxation, house values and rents, public workers, population sorting, and
crime. The main contribution of this paper is to show how the court system affects
economic outcomes through minority voting rights protection. While the effects
of voting rights statutory law have been studied (Husted and Kenny, 1997; Cascio
and Washington, 2014; Naidu, 2012), the impact on economic outcomes of voting
49Graphs 11a to 11e show a robustness check of the heterogeneity analysis but in that case using
the number of lynchings in each county between 1900 and 1930 as a proxy for discrimination.
Results are very similar: the effects on spending and taxes are evenly distributed for all levels of
past discrimination. The only difference is that for tax collection the effect is stronger in places
that suffered more discrimination when measured by lynchings, which is not the case when I
proxy discrimination with % of Wallace’s support.
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rights protection through court decisions is a topic that deserves further study.
I have focused on one specific discriminatory electoral method, at-large elec-
tions, and its alternative, single-district elections. The first results show that after
the enactment of single-districts local public good spending (mainly fire protection
spending) and tax collection increased. Such finding is contrary to what we would
have expected from an increase in ethnic diversity in the city council: if racial
heterogeneity brings disagreement over public goods, there should have been a
decrease in spending and taxation (Alesina et al., 1999). Very little is known
about how the negative effects of ethnic heterogeneity documented in the litera-
ture (Alesina and LaFerrara, 2005; Alesina et al., 1999; Easterly and Levine, 1997)
might be mediated through institutions. This paper suggests that public good un-
derprovision might be related to a lack of representation of minorities, and that
the lack of public goods can be alleviated by guaranteeing their representation.
A second set of results shows that blacks are likely to benefit from the changes
towards non-discriminatory electoral methods: the fraction of black public workers
and black citizens increases at the expense of whites and other minorities after a
change towards single-districts. In addition, the growth rate of black home values
and black rents increases more than that of whites after a change in electoral rule.
These findings are consistent with models of legislative bargaining (Baron and
Ferejohn, 1989; Persson and Tabellini, 2000). If blacks are among the less powerful
groups in the city council, they will form part of minimum winning coalitions
because their support is the easiest to obtain. Thus, we should expect that the
changes in the public budget and public jobs are targeted to black communities.
Historical sources that document the pragmatism of local black politicians, who
saw politics as the art of the possible, and were ready to bargain with whites, also
support this point (Lawson, 1985). At the same time, this set of findings discards
that the increases in local public goods and taxation arise from a common-pool
problem (Weingast et al., 1981), because such framework predicts increases for all
districts. I provide further evidence against a common-pool channel by showing
that the effects are not stronger the more districts are created.
Finally, I show that the effects happen for all cities independently of their
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level of past discrimination. Indeed, the evidence suggests that the effects are
weakly stronger for places that suffered more discrimination. Given past levels of
institutional persistence in the US South (Valelly, 2004; Acemoglu and Robinson
(2006 and 2008), this and the previous findings underscore the relevance of the
common law system in protecting minority voting rights.
Further work could focus on other discriminatory electoral devices other than
at-large elections (Kousser, 1984), or on its effects on other levels of government
(i.e., school districts. NCVR (2006)). Likewise, future research could concentrate
on understanding if federal interventions to improve minorities’ welfater through
transfer systems might not succeed (Cascio et al., 2013) because of the leeway that
local institutions have in allocating federal grants.
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A Figures
Figure 1: Map of Electoral District with At-Large Elections in Florence, AL
Figure 2: Map of Electoral Districts with Single-District Elections in Florence,AL
Notes: Figures 1 and 2 show the electoral constituencies when elections are at-large (figure 1)
or organized through single-districts (figure 2). The maps are from one of the municipalities in the
sample, the city of Florence, Alabama. When elections are at-large, the whole city is the electoral
district. In contrast, when elections are organized by single-districts, the city is partitioned in
many electoral constituencies. For the case of Florence, district 1 concentrates most of 19.4% of
black population in the city, so that the black community could have a representative.
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1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990
Year
Notes: The red dashed lines show years in which a landmark case for the anti-vote dilution
jurisprudence was ruled. The black line shows the only case that increased the burden of proof
that plaintiffs needed to demonstrate in court to ban at-large elections. Each peak of changes
happens after each of the three significant anti-vote dilution rulings, whereas the years in which
there were barely changes correspond to periods when discriminatory intent had to be proven
(1970-1972), or after the negative ruling for anti-vote dilution (1980-1982). Sources are Davidson
and Grofman (1994) and International City Managers’ Association surveys.
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Test of Joint Significance, 5%
Notes: The figure shows the F statistic of joint significance of the year of change for the main
city variables that I use. The red solid line is F’s test critical value. For only two dependent
variables, the monthly rent paid by blacks and the share of white public workers, the joint test
of significance is significant at the 5% level. Overall, there does not appear to be a systematic
relationship between the timing of the changes and city characteristics.
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Notes: The figure shows the difference between the fraction of voting-age blacks with respect
to the voting-age population and the fraction of black local elected officeholders. The higher
the difference, the less are blacks represented in local offices proportionally to the size of its
population. We can see a reduction in the difference during the 1970s and 1980s, years after
the poll taxes and literacy tests were outlawed, that is related to the creation of single-districts.
Source is Valelly (2004).
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(e) Dependent variable is Fire employees
Notes: the graphs show the βk coefficients of regression 2. I include 5 leads and lags, and omit period -1. Thus,
the coefficients reflect the size of the effect relative to a year before the change took place. The figures do not
show pre-treatment trends. The effects start the year of the change, and grow over time.
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(e) Placebo: dep. variable is
Fire employees
Notes: the graphs show the βk coefficients of regression 2 for simulated placebos. I include 5 leads and lags, and
omit period -1. Thus, the coefficients reflect the size of the effect relative to a year before the change took place.
The placebo coefficients are always around zero, and confirm that the actual effect is driven by the change in
electoral rules.
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(e) Dep. variable: FireEmp.
Notes: the graph shows the coefficients of three of the 1000 simulated placebos. The dynamic specification is
equation 2. I rank the regressions according to their 4th lag coefficient and I pick the coefficients in the 2.5, 50,
and 97.5 percentiles..
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Effect on Fire Protection Employees
(e)
*Notes: The figure plots the coefficients β2k of regression 3. The sample includes only cities that outlawed
at-large elections. The coefficients β2k reflect the change in the outcome variable with respect to cities that
created 4 or less single-districts. The results provide evidence against the common-pool hypothesis, that
predicted a positively monotonic relationship between spending and the number of districts.
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Effect on Fire Employment
(e)
Notes: the solid line shows the coefficients of the interaction Changeit ∗WallaceSupportck. The specification is
equation 5. The coefficient shows the increase in each dependent variable of interest with respect to a city in a
county where electoral vote for George Wallace was lower than 10%.
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Figure 11: Heterogeneity Analysis: Effects by Number of Lynchings for every
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Lynchings per 10000 blacks in 1990
Coefficient Lower CI
Upper CI
Effect on Fire Emp.
(e)
Notes: the solid line shows the coefficients of the interaction Changeit ∗ Lynchingsck. The specification follows
equation 5. The coefficient shows the increase in each dependent variable of interest with respect to a city in a
county where no blacks were lynched.
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B Tables
Table 1: City Budget
(1) (2) (3)
% Budget $ Per Capita Ratio Trans./Exp.
Utilities 0.303 615.9 0
(0.00399) (12.97) (0.0)
Police Protection 0.0964 118.8 0
(0.000817) (0.884) (0.0)
Roads 0.0755 91.88 596.1
(0.000871) (0.949) (239.3)
Sewage 0.0619 86.02 0.00207
(0.00104) (1.696) (0.000908)
Fire Protection 0.0652 79.94 0
(0.000580) (0.580) (0.0)
Parks 0.0440 56.38 0
(0.000531) (0.708) (0.0)
Hospitals 0.0268 57.53 8651.2
(0.00170) (3.912) (3131.8)
Housing 0.0261 34.32 36628.3
(0.000730) (0.983) (5109.1)
Observations 3906 3906 3906
Notes: sample of 126 cities between 1970 and 2000. Standard errors in parentheses. The
table shows the 8 main spending categories in cities, sorted by expenditure per capita. The
first column is the fraction they represent in the budget. The column does not add up to
1 because I am not showing all the budget items. The second column is spending in $ per
capita. the last column is the ratio of targeted transfers to each item with respect to the
level of spending in each category. For police and fire protection, as well as parks there are










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3: Results for Local Public Goods and Local Public Goods employment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
LPG LPG LPG emp. LPG emp.
Change 0.0751** 0.0541 0.0572*** 0.0412**
(0.0331) (0.0328) (0.0187) (0.0164)
Population -0.178** -0.187 -0.339*** -0.389***
(0.0807) (0.128) (0.0529) (0.0618)
% old -0.0716*** -0.0658 -0.0536*** -0.0288
(0.0226) (0.0425) (0.0185) (0.0291)
% black -0.0111 -0.00821 0.00773 0.00495
(0.00894) (0.0117) (0.00743) (0.0111)
Property tax limit 0.00988 0.0124 -0.0167 -0.0110
(0.0253) (0.0254) (0.0135) (0.0131)
City FE Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y
County trend N Y N Y
Observations 3906 3906 3485 3485
R2 0.570 0.606 0.343 0.501
Notes: The table shows the coefficient of the variable of interest, Change, for the main
dependent variables and for several specifications. All the dependent variables are in
logarithm and per capita terms. The first two columns show the results when dependent
variable is spending in local public good. Columns 3 and 4 show the results when dependent
variable is the number of employees in the local public good sector. Sample is a balanced
panel and comprises all cities with at least 2.5% black people or at most 40% black citizens.
The results are robust to changing the lower threshold to 5% and to moving the higher
threshold up to 50% The lower sample size when the dependent variable is public employees
is because cities not always report it. Robust standard errors, clustered at the city level,





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 7: Distributional Results
Dependent Variable All Decades 10 Year 20 Year 30 Year
Frac. Black Pub. Wor.
2.873** 2.42*** 4.432*** 5.959***
1.14 0.486 0.29 1.705
Frac. White Pub. Wor.
-0.72 -1.496** -3.007*** -3.288
1.224 0.677 0.558 2.481
Frac. Other Pub. Wor.
-2.152** -0.951** -1.472*** -2.67
1.011 0.427 0.473 1.979
Frac. Black Pop.
0.016*** 2.773*** 4.759*** 8.009***
0.004 0.196 0.209 1.02
Frac. White Pop.
-3.07** -1.716** -6.177*** -6.487***
1.279 0.737 0.46 2.335
Frac. Other Pop.
-0.002 -1.059* 1.459*** -1.522
0.005 0.627 0.345 2.292
Black Median Value
0.05 0.051** 0.16*** 0.159**
0.047 0.023 0.028 0.071
White Median Value
-0.084* -0.029 0.055* 0.104*
0.047 0.022 0.029 0.057
Black Rent
0.259*** 0.366*** 0.523*** 0.314***
0.054 0.027 0.026 0.066
White Rent
0.181*** 0.234*** 0.281*** 0.153***
0.036 0.019 0.019 0.045
Notes: The table shows the coefficients of the variable of interest, Change, for the main
dependent variables used to explore the distributional consequences of changing the
electoral rule from at-large to single-districts. The dependent variables are from the US
Census and are thus decadal. The specification is in first differences. Column 1 pools data
from all decades, and thus captures immediate effects of the change. Columns 2, 3 and
4 explore effects in 10 years, 20 years, and 30 years windows. Robust standard errors,
clustered at the city level, are shown in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at
5%; *** significant at 1%
59
Table 8: Number of Homicides
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Murders Murders White Victim White Victim Black Victim Black Victim
Change -0.000142 0.00717 -0.00495 -0.00272 0.00474 0.00969∗∗
(0.00794) (0.00829) (0.00441) (0.00487) (0.00493) (0.00477)
Population -0.0142 -0.0159 -0.00434 -0.00636 -0.0108 -0.0106
(0.0127) (0.0172) (0.00811) (0.00935) (0.00922) (0.0111)
% old -0.00205 -0.0188∗∗ 0.000256 -0.00657 -0.00175 -0.0107∗
(0.00547) (0.00897) (0.00281) (0.00479) (0.00317) (0.00553)
% black 0.00832∗∗∗ 0.00395 0.00315∗∗ 0.00223 0.00512∗∗∗ 0.00160
(0.00279) (0.00455) (0.00149) (0.00290) (0.00181) (0.00225)
Property tax limit 0.00326 0.00325 -0.00333 -0.00331 0.00858 0.00856
(0.0105) (0.0106) (0.00648) (0.00657) (0.00696) (0.00704)
City FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
County trend N Y N Y N Y
Observations 3402 3402 3402 3402 3402 3402
R2 0.173 0.221 0.105 0.141 0.120 0.166
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: The table shows the coefficients of the variable of interest, Change, for several measures
of the number of murder per capita that happened in each city for every year. The first two
columns aggregate all homicides, third and fourth column have as dependent variable the
number of murders in which the victim was white. Similarly, columns 5 and 6 are for the case of
homicides in which the victim is black. Even numbered columns include a county linear trend.
Robust standard errors, clustered at the city level, are shown in parentheses. * significant at
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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